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NOTE

TEXT(PLUS-OTHER-STUFF)UALISM:
TEXTUALISTS’ PERPLEXING USE OF
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL’S
MANUAL ON THE ADMINISTRATIVE
PROCEDURE ACT
K.M. Lewis*
Textualist judges, such as U.S. Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia, are
well known for their outspoken, adamant refusal to consult legislative history and
its analogues when interpreting ambiguous provisions of statutory terms. Nevertheless, in administrative law cases, textualist judges regularly quote the
Attorney General’s Manual on the Administrative Procedure Act, an unenacted Department of Justice document that shares all the characteristics of
legislative history that textualists find odious: unreliability, bias, and failure to
pass through the bicameralism and presentment processes mandated by the U.S.
Constitution. As a result, judges that rely on the Manual in administrative law
cases arguably reach inaccurate results that aggrandize the Executive Branch.
This Note canvasses the possible explanations for this phenomenon and ultimately
concludes that there is no principled way that textualist judges can reconcile their
use of the Manual with their jurisprudential philosophy. In other words, there is
no principled reason to rely on the Manual while simultaneously rejecting more
traditional forms of legislative history.
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INTRODUCTION
The textualist critique of legislative history is well documented.1 Legislative history and its analogues2 are not authoritative, the argument goes,
because unlike the text of the statute, the history has not passed through
the bicameralism and presentment process mandated by the U.S. Constitution.3 Textualists likewise argue that legislative history is often inconsistent
and frequently manipulated for political ends.4

1.
E.g., Antonin Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System: The Role of United
States Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws 16, in A MATTER OF
INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW (Amy Gutmann et al eds., 1997); Frank
H. Easterbrook, The Role of Original Intent in Statutory Construction, 11 HARV. J.L. & PUB.
POL’Y 59 (1988) [hereinafter Easterbrook, Original Intent]; Alex Kozinski, Should Reading
Legislative History be an Impeachable Offense?, 31 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 807 (1998); John F.
Manning, Textualism as a Nondelegation Doctrine, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 673 (1997) [hereinafter
Manning, Nondelegation]; see infra Part I.
2.
For instance, the Advisory Committee Notes to the Federal Rules of Evidence,
discussed in further detail infra notes 7, 30–32, 60 and accompanying text, may be considered analogous to legislative history.
3.
E.g., Manning, Nondelegation, supra note 1, at 675 (internal citations omitted).
4.
E.g., Kozinski, supra note 1, at 810, 813.
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Given this critique, it seems anomalous that even the most ardent textualists use the unenacted Attorney General’s Manual on the Administrative
Procedure Act5 as a guide to interpreting the Administrative Procedure Act
(APA),6 especially given textualists’ refusal to use legislative history and its
analogues in other contexts, such as when interpreting the Federal Rules of
Evidence.7
It is argued that the Manual is reliable and authoritative due to the
“role played by the Department of Justice in drafting the legislation,”8 and
because Congress arguably “sought to simply adopt the prevailing practices
of judicial review at the time the APA was enacted.”9 A closer examination,
however, reveals that the same textualist critiques of legislative history
apply to the Manual.10 The asserted rationales for the Manual’s reliability
and authoritative status are also applicable to the legislative history of numerous other statutes and rules, but textualists do not resort to legislative
history and its analogues in those contexts. Moreover, the Manual has not
passed through the bicameralism and presentment process; worse, the
Manual was published after the APA was enacted.11 Finally, there is evidence
that the Manual may also offer a biased and politicized, and therefore dubious, interpretation of the APA.12 It therefore appears that textualist judges
who rely upon the Manual are acting in an inconsistent or unprincipled
5.
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ATTORNEY GENERAL’S
STRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT (1947) [hereinafter MANUAL].

MANUAL

ON THE

ADMINI-

6.
5 U.S.C. §§ 500–706 (2006); see infra Part IV.
7.
See Tome v. United States, 513 U.S. 150, 167–68 (1995) (Scalia, J., concurring)
(refusing to join majority opinion in its entirety due to the opinion’s reliance on the Advisory Committee Notes to the Federal Rules of Evidence); see also discussion infra Part II.
8.
Robin J. Arzt, Adjudications by Administrative Law Judges Pursuant to the Social
Security Act Are Adjudications Pursuant to the Administrative Procedure Act, 22 J. NAT’L ASS’N
ADMIN. L. JUDGES 279, 288 (2002) (citations omitted).
9.
Christopher M. Buell, Norton v. Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance: The U.S.
Supreme Court Fails to Act on Agency Inaction, 67 U. PITT. L. REV. 641, 645 (2006).
10.
See infra Parts III–V.
11.
Dean Smith, Lawmaking on Federal Lands: Criminal Liability and the Public Property
Exception of the Administrative Procedure Act, 23 J. LAND RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 313, 321
(2003).
12.
John F. Duffy, Administrative Common Law in Judicial Review, 77 TEX. L. REV. 113,
119 (1998) (describing the Manual as “a highly political document designed to minimize the
impact of the new statute on executive agencies”); George B. Shepherd, Fierce Compromise:
The Administrative Procedure Act Emerges from New Deal Politics, 90 NW. U. L. REV. 1557,
1682–83 (1996) (describing the Manual as “a transparently one-sided, post hoc interpretation
of a done deal” that fails to accurately “present the true nature of the APA compromise”); cf.
Jack M. Beermann, End the Failed Chevron Experiment Now: How Chevron has Failed and
Why it Can and Should be Overruled, 42 CONN. L. REV. 779, 790 (2010) (“[A]lthough the
Attorney General’s Manual should be considered when trying to understand the APA, especially in those cases in which the Manual’s interpretation is contrary to the Executive
Branch’s interests, it may be unreliable when it advances a pro-executive point of view.”).
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manner; they should either refuse to use the Manual as an interpretive tool,
or abandon strict textualism and treat all legislative history as potentially
persuasive if sufficient indicia of reliability are present.13
In Part I of this Note, I summarize the textualist critique of legislative
history and its analogues. Part II briefly describes the APA and the Manual
and also explains why the Manual may not be a reliable guide to the APA.
Part III catalogues examples of textualist judges using the Manual, and
explains why this phenomenon is anomalous. Part IV surveys several possible justifications for textualist use of the Manual, but ultimately deems
them all unsatisfactory. Part V speculates as to why textualists utilize the
Manual despite the apparent theoretical inconsistency. I conclude that there
is no principled reason for textualist judges to consult the Manual but not
legislative history proper.
This Note is not intended to argue for or against textualism as an
interpretive method generally; plenty has been written on both sides of that
debate.14 Nor do I attempt to demonstrate whether interpretations of the
APA that eschewed references to the Manual would produce normatively
desirable or undesirable results.15 I merely argue that use of the Manual is
analytically inconsistent with the jurisprudential philosophy of textualism.

13.

Some scholars have argued that textualism

does not require the blanket exclusion of legislative history from judicial consideration. When a party prepares a brief in litigation or a professor writes a law
review article, a court is capable of evaluating the persuasiveness of the author’s
contentions on the merits, even though that author may have an agenda. When
the court examines a committee report or sponsor’s statement, its critical capacity
is no less. The court must give serious consideration to the information found in
the legislative history, but it must assess the persuasiveness of its representations,
quite apart from the congressional source of the history’s assertions.
Manning, Nondelegation, supra note 1, at 732–37.
14.
E.g., A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW, supra
note 1 (containing an essay on the merits of textualism by Justice Antonin Scalia, relevant
critiques by Laurence H. Tribe and Ronald Dworkin, and Justice Scalia’s response to these
critiques); Stephen Breyer, On the Uses of Legislative History in Interpreting Statutes, 65 S. CAL.
L. REV. 845 (1991) (defending judicial use of legislative history); William N. Eskridge, Jr.,
The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L. REV. 621, 625 (1990) [hereinafter Eskridge, New Textualism] (arguing that the textualist critique “is quite powerful but not completely persuasive”);
William N. Eskridge, Jr., Dynamic Statutory Interpretation, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 1479 (1987);
Lars Noah, Divining Regulatory Intent: The Place for a ‘Legislative History’ of Agency Rules, 51
HASTINGS L.J. 255, 266–74 (2000) (summarizing the conflicts between “The Textualist
Critique,” “The Intentionalist Response,” and “Dynamic Interpretation”).
15.
I do note that citations to the Manual will likely produce results that favor the
Executive Branch in ways that do not necessarily match the intent of Congress when enacting the APA, but I leave for future scholarly exploration whether or not this pro-executive
approach to administrative law would be preferable.
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I. TEXTUALISM AND THE CRITIQUE OF LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
AND ITS ANALOGUES
Textualism is a school of statutory interpretation with numerous highprofile adherents in the Judicial Branch, including Justice Scalia and Justice
Thomas of the U.S. Supreme Court,16 Judge Easterbrook of the Seventh
Circuit, and Judge Kozinski of the Ninth Circuit.17 Although there are
arguably many distinct subgenres of textualism, each with their own interpretive and theoretical nuances,18 textualism generally holds that judges,
when interpreting a legal text, should draw meaning only from the “ ‘objectified’ intent” of the legislature as expressed in the enacted text of the law,
rather than conjectures about what the legislature subjectively meant and
intended.19 Textualists find absurd the idea that a collective body composed
of ideologically opposed partisan factions could have a discernible, monolithic “intent” that can be attributed to Congress as a whole, especially
regarding the meaning of statutory ambiguities.20 The textualist method is
aptly described by Judge Easterbrook as follows:
We should look at the statutory structure and hear the words as
they would sound in the mind of a skilled, objectively reasonable
user of words . . . . The meaning of statutes is to be found not in
the subjective, multiple mind of Congress but in the understanding
of the objectively reasonable person.
If this method yields no confident answer, we may put the statute
down—the question is not within its domain.21
Therefore, say textualists, judges should not refer to legislative history and
its analogues when determining the meaning of a legal text. Legislative
16.
William N. Eskridge, Jr., Should the Supreme Court Read The Federalist But Not
Statutory Legislative History?, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1301, 1301–02 (1998) [hereinafter
Eskridge, Federalist].
17.
Eskridge, New Textualism, supra note 14, at 646–47.
18.
See, e.g., Eskridge, Federalist, supra note 16, at 1306–08 (comparing and contrasting
the textualist philosophies of Justice Scalia and Justice Thomas); James P. Nehf, Textualism in
the Lower Courts: Lessons from Judges Interpreting Consumer Legislation, 26 RUTGERS L.J. 1, 8–9,
53–54 (1994) (identifying “four different approaches to textual interpretation” and claiming
that the differences between “various forms of textualism” yield “highly unpredictable and
inconsistent results”).
19.
E.g., Scalia, supra note 1, at 16–18 (emphasis added).
20.
E.g., Manning, Nondelegation, supra note 1, at 675, 684–86 (citations omitted)
(“[T]extualist judges argue that a 535-member legislature has no ‘genuine’ collective intent
with respect to matters left ambiguous by the statute itself. Even if Congress did have a
collective intent, they add, courts act improperly when they equate the views of a committee
or sponsor with the intent of the entire Congress and the President.”).
21.
Easterbrook, Original Intent, supra note 1, at 65.
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history has not passed through the “bicameralism, presentment, and veto
provisions of Article I” of the U.S. Constitution;22 thus, “recourse to legislative history improperly accords the force of law to statements that have
not satisfied the explicit constitutional provisions specifying how a bill
becomes law.”23 Textualists argue that consulting legislative history is not
only unconstitutional, but also undemocratic and tyrannical. Basing “the
meaning of a law” on “what the lawgiver meant, rather than what the lawgiver promulgated,” is analogous to the insidious “trick the emperor Nero
was said to engage in: posting edicts high up on the pillars, so that they
could not be easily read.”24
Textualists also argue that “legislative history is often contradictory,”
and therefore unreliable as an interpretive tool.25 The legislative process is
inherently competitive and adversarial. Each legislator has incentives to
sneak statements into the legislative history that support his or her ideological agenda.26 As a result, argue textualists, judges can find legislative
history that supports almost any proposition they seek to establish. In the
immortal words of Judge Harold Leventhal, “consulting legislative history
is like ‘looking over a crowd of people and picking out your friends.’ ”27
A good example of textualists’ reluctance to utilize legislative history
and its analogues is Tome v. United States.28 The U.S. Supreme Court based
its holding29 in part on “an examination of the Advisory Committee’s
Notes to the Federal Rules of Evidence.”30 Justice Scalia joined the

22.
Note, Why Learned Hand Would Never Consult Legislative History Today, 105 HARV.
L. REV. 1005, 1007 (1992).
23.
Id.; see U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7; Easterbrook, Original Intent, supra note 1, at 64 (“If
we took an opinion poll of Congress today on a raft of issues and found out its views, would
those views become the law? Certainly not. They must run the gamut of the process—and
process is the essence of legislation. That means committees, fighting for time on the floor,
compromise because other members want some unrelated objective, passage, exposure to
veto, and so on.”); Manning, Nondelegation, supra note 1, at 675.
24.
Scalia, supra note 1, at 17.
25.
Kozinski, supra note 1, at 813.
26.
The incentives are bolstered by the unlikelihood of getting caught. Oftentimes
congresspersons have not read a pending bill’s voluminous legislative history, and thus
cannot detect and correct alleged attempts to influence the judiciary. See Scalia, supra note 1,
at 32–34.
27.
Kozinski, supra note 1, at 813 (quoting Patricia M. Wald, Some Observations on the
Use of Legislative History in the 1981 Supreme Court Term, 68 IOWA L. REV. 195, 214 (1983)).
28.
Tome v. United States, 513 U.S. 150 (1995).
29.
The holding of Tome is irrelevant for the purposes of this Note and is therefore
not discussed.
30.
Tome, 513 U.S. at 160. The Advisory Committee was composed of preeminent
lawyers and legal scholars appointed to draft the Federal Rules of Evidence. The Advisory
Committee Notes, which describe in greater detail the Committee’s intent and understanding of the rules, are widely used by courts to interpret the Federal Rules of Evidence. See
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Court’s opinion except for the Part “devoted entirely to a discussion of the
Advisory Committee’s Notes.”31 Despite wholly agreeing with the Court’s
result, Justice Scalia wrote a separate concurrence criticizing the majority’s
use of those Notes. Although Justice Scalia first admitted, “I have previously acquiesced in, . . . and indeed myself engaged in, . . . similar use of the
Advisory Committee Notes,”32 he then argued:
More mature consideration has persuaded me that is wrong. Having been prepared by a body of experts, the Notes are assuredly
persuasive scholarly commentaries . . . . But they bear no special
authoritativeness as the work of the draftsmen . . . . It is the words
of the Rules that have been authoritatively adopted . . . . Like a
judicial opinion and like a statute, the promulgated Rule says what
it says, regardless of the intent of its drafters.33
Justice Scalia’s concurrence in Tome illustrates both the theoretical objections and aversion that textualist judges have to legislative history.

II. THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT AND THE ATTORNEY
GENERAL’S MANUAL
A. Brief Overview of the Administrative Procedure Act
The APA is perhaps the most important statute in U.S. administrative
law. Enacted in 1946, the APA is “designed to govern both internal agency
procedure and judicial review” of agency actions.35 Among other things, the
APA establishes default presumptions regarding what procedures agencies
need to follow when engaging in rulemaking and adjudication proceedings
of various levels of formality, and what criteria courts should use to assess
agency decisions.36 Along similar lines, the APA “affords interested parties
34

DAVID ALAN SKLANSKY, EVIDENCE: CASES, COMMENTARY, AND PROBLEMS 6–8 (2d ed.
2008).
31.
Tome, 513 U.S. at 167 (Scalia, J., concurring).
32.
Id. (citations omitted).
33.
Id. at 167–68.
34.
See, e.g., Alan B. Morrison, The Administrative Procedure Act: A Living and Responsive Law, 72 VA. L. REV. 253, 254 (1986) (describing the APA as the “centerpiece of
administrative procedure”); Shepherd, supra note 12, at 1158–59 (citations omitted) (calling
the APA a “landmark” piece of legislation that “permitted the growth of the modern regulatory state”).
35.
Duffy, supra note 12, at 114.
36.
See 5 U.S.C. §§ 551–559, 701–706 (2006); Buell, supra note 9, at 644–45; Donna
M. Nagy, Judicial Reliance on Regulatory Interpretations in SEC No-Action Letters: Current
Problems and a Proposed Framework, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 921, 930 n.32 (1998).
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the right to participate in an agency’s rulemaking process.”37 The APA also
contains provisions regarding the appointment, discipline, and decisional
independence of Administrative Law Judges.38

B. The Attorney General’s Manual
The Manual, considered “one of the most comprehensive and respected
reports on the APA,”39 was “written shortly after passage of the APA in
response to numerous inquiries about the intended meanings of various
APA provisions.”40 The Manual “was originally issued ‘as a guide to the
agencies in adjusting their procedures to the requirements of the Act.’ ”41
Among numerous other things, the Manual attempts to clarify the difference between rulemaking and adjudication and to delineate what types of
agency actions fall within each category,42 who may preside over which
types of administrative hearings,43 the scope of various exceptions within
the Act,44 and the extent to which courts should defer to agency discretion.45 Additionally, the Manual explains that “the judicial review provisions
of the APA were meant to codify” the administrative common law extant at
the time of enactment.46 Because the Manual “was prepared by the Department of Justice contemporaneously with the APA’s enactment,” the
Supreme Court “has indicated that the manual merits interpretive
weight.”47 Courts therefore frequently review the Manual when interpreting
ambiguous provisions of the APA.48 Estimates indicate that federal courts
have cited the Manual in roughly 250 cases since its publication,49 and

37.
Nagy, supra note 36, at 930 n.32 (citing 5 U.S.C. §§ 551–559, 701–706).
38.
5 U.S.C. §§ 1305, 3105, 3344, 5372, 7521 (2010).
39.
Catherine Zaller, The Case for Strict Statutory Construction of Mandatory Agency
Deadlines Under Section 706(1), 42 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1545, 1550 (2001).
40.
Smith, supra note 11, at 321.
41.
Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 218 (1988) (Scalia, J., concurring) (quoting MANUAL, supra note 5, at 6).
42.
Arzt, supra note 8, at 290–91 (citing MANUAL, supra note 5, at 14–15).
43.
See id. at 307–09 (citing MANUAL, supra note 5, at 72, 132, app. B).
44.
See Smith, supra note 11, at 320–21 (citing MANUAL, supra note 6, at 27).
45.
See Zaller, supra note 39, 1550–52.
46.
Beermann, supra note 12, at 790 (citing MANUAL, supra note 5, at 108).
47.
John F. Manning, Nonlegislative Rules, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 893, 918 n.129
(2004).
48.
E.g., Steadman v. Sec. Exch. Comm’n, 450 U.S. 91, 102 n.22 (1981) (citing Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519, 546
(1978)).
49.
A Westlaw search in the “ALLFEDS” database with the search terms “(“attorney
general’s manual” “ag’s manual” “ag manual”) /p (“administrative procedure act” “apa”)”
performed on March 19, 2011 returned 227 documents. Although these search results admittedly include cases that only cite the Manual indirectly (e.g., citing precedent that quotes or
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judges of all ideological and jurisprudential stripes have relied on the Manual
to support various propositions in high-profile cases.50

C. Questions Regarding the Manual’s Reliability
There is reason to doubt, however, whether judicial deference to the
Manual is warranted. As Professor Shepherd argues in his extensivelyresearched article on the heated legislative battle that led to the APA:
The legislative compromise that produced the APA built many
ambiguous provisions into the statute. Each party to the negotiations then attempted to create legislative history: to create a record
that would cause future reviewing courts to interpret the ambiguities in a manner that would favor the party. Conservative
congressional committees published conservative interpretations.
The administration offered its much different description in its
Attorney General’s Manual On The Administrative Procedure Act . . . .
Neither account may present the true nature of the APA compromise. Instead, each account is a transparently one-sided, post hoc
interpretation of a done deal.51
If this assertion is correct, then the Manual is neither an authoritative nor
accurate guide to the meaning of contested provisions of the APA. Given
that the Manual was written to advance the interests of the Executive
Branch, the Manual is arguably “unreliable when it advances a proexecutive point of view.”52
Similarly, there is reason to doubt whether the Manual accurately
describes the preexisting common law of judicial review of administrative
actions. Although the Manual asserts that the APA merely codified the
common law, Professor Beermann explains that “existing law was so unclear
on many important issues, especially with regard to judicial review of legal
interpretations, that codification would have meant that the APA provision
had basically no discernible content.”53 Professor Duffy goes further, describing the Manual as “a highly political document[,] designed to minimize
the impact of the new statute on executive agencies,” and stating that it
cites the Manual), my experience running numerous searches for cases relevant to this Note
suggests that this particular search is more underinclusive than overinclusive.
50.
See Shinseki v. Sanders, 129 S.Ct. 1696, 1704 (2009) (Breyer, J.); Norton v. S.
Utah Wilderness Alliance, 542 U.S. 55, 63–64 (2004) (Scalia, J.); Darby v. Cisneros, 509
U.S. 137, 148 n.10 (1993) (Blackmun, J.); Vermont Yankee, 435 U.S. at 546. For a timeline of
the Supreme Court’s use of the Manual since the 1960s, see infra note 148.
51.
Shepherd, supra note 12, at 1682–83 (citations omitted).
52.
Beermann, supra note 12, at 790.
53.
Id.
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“shrewdly characterized the APA provisions governing judicial review as
merely a ‘restatement’ and thereby invited courts and the bar to treat the
Act as something less than a statute, as subservient to judge-made doctrine.”54 Judicial reliance on the Manual for interpreting these provisions
therefore appears misplaced.
Moreover, unlike traditional legislative history, the Manual was written
after, not before, the APA was enacted.55 This casts further doubt on the
Manual’s status as an authoritative guide to the APA. Presumably, if a congressional committee that sponsored a bill issued a statement subsequent to
the bill’s enactment describing its understanding of the law’s intended
meaning, even judges sympathetic to the use of legislative history would
look askance at the document. As the Supreme Court once stated:
[A]s time passes memories fade and a person’s perception of his
earlier intention may change. Thus, even when it would otherwise
be useful, subsequent legislative history will rarely override a reasonable interpretation of a statute that can be gleaned from its
language and legislative history prior to its enactment.56
This fact makes the Manual look even more like a post hoc attempt by the
Executive Branch to interpret the APA in a manner beneficial to its interests.
In short, the Manual commits the selfsame sins that relegate other
forms of legislative history to textualist hell. It has not passed through the
constitutionally-mandated bicameralism and presentment process. Indeed,
it was prepared after the legislation was enacted. It lacks sufficient indicia of
objectivity, reliability, and probative value. It was prepared by an interested
party with a large stake in the outcome of the legislation. The Manual
seems to fall squarely within the crosshairs of the textualist critique.

III. TEXTUALIST USE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL’S MANUAL
Nevertheless, textualist judges have often cited and quoted the Manual
to support numerous claims about the APA’s provisions.
For instance, Justice Scalia’s unanimous opinion in Norton v. Southern
Utah Wilderness Alliance57 favorably quoted the Manual, calling it “a document whose reasoning we have often found persuasive.”58 Justice Thomas,

54.
55.
56.
(1980).
57.
58.

Duffy, supra note 12, at 119.
Smith, supra note 11, at 321.
Consumer Prod. Safety Comm’n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 118 n.13
542 U.S. 55 (2004).
Id. at 63.
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another one of the Supreme Court’s prominent textualists,59 joined the
majority opinion without objecting to the Court’s use of the Manual. It is
worth noting that Norton was decided nearly a decade after Tome, in which
Justice Scalia admitted that “[m]ore mature consideration” persuaded him
that use of the Advisory Committee Notes on the Federal Rules of Evidence “is wrong,” and broke from and chided the majority despite wholly
agreeing with the Court’s final result.60 There is not much qualitative
difference between the Advisory Committee Notes and the Manual; both
were interpretive guidelines issued by an entity charged with drafting the
law in question. It is therefore unclear why the Court’s leading textualist
would cite one but not the other.
Likewise, Justice Scalia’s concurring opinion in Bowen v. Georgetown
University Hospital cited the Manual to demonstrate that the Secretary of
Health and Human Services’ litigation position was “out of accord” with
the APA’s requirements, and referred to the Manual as the “most authoritative interpretation of the APA” and worthy of “great weight.”61
Justice Scalia also quoted the Manual when he delivered the opinion
of the Court in Director, Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs v.
Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co.,62 which Justice Thomas
also joined.63 Additionally, Justice Scalia favorably cited the Manual in
his dissenting opinions in Bowen v. Massachusetts64 and Webster v.

59.
See Eskridge, Federalist, supra note 16, at 1301–02. I should note, however, that
although Justice Thomas may accurately be described as a textualist “who has often . . .
joined Scalia’s attacks on statutory legislative history,” id. at 1307, he “does not join Justice
Scalia’s insistence that legislative history be expunged completely from public law.” Id. at
1301 n.3.
60.
Tome v. United States, 513 U.S. 150, 167–68 (1995) (Scalia, J., concurring).
61.
488 U.S. 204, 218–19 (1988) (Scalia, J., concurring). Oddly enough, this same
portion of Justice Scalia’s concurrence also favorably cites legislative history in the form of a
house report. One might therefore counter that Bowen and the Scalia opinions that precede
it chronologically are false positives—cases that represent Justice Scalia’s jurisprudence
before he committed fully to the tenets of textualism—and consequently do not provide
support for my thesis. Justice Scalia has not always exhibited the same level of aversion to
legislative history and its analogues. See Tome, 513 U.S. at 167 (Scalia, J., concurring) (“I
have previously acquiesced in, . . . and indeed myself engaged in, . . . use of the Advisory
Committee Notes.”). While this argument carries some weight, it cannot overcome the
strong support created by Justice Scalia’s ringing endorsement of the Manual in Norton. But
see Manning, Nondelegation, supra note 1, at 731–37 (describing that a few textualist uses of
legislative history may be defensible, particularly “the use of legislative history to identify
the events that precipitated the enactment of legislation,” but “only after a full and independent verification of the accuracy and persuasiveness of its contents”).
62.
514 U.S. 122, 126–27 (1995).
63.
Id. at 123.
64.
487 U.S. 879, 922 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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Doe.65 Justice Scalia similarly cited the Manual before his elevation to the
Supreme Court.66
Moreover, despite the fact that if an “opinion for the Court relies on
legislative history in any way, Scalia will typically concur only in the judgment, often with a pointed critique of the majority’s misguided reliance on
legislative history,”67 Justice Scalia has also joined several opinions written
by other judges that utilize the Manual.68
It is admittedly true that Justices Scalia and Thomas joined all but Part
III of the Court’s opinion in Darby v. Cisneros, which engaged in a lengthy

65.
486 U.S. 592, 609 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting). Relatedly, Justice Scalia’s opinions have also referred to other post-enactment documents penned by the Attorney General
purporting to give agencies guidance in response to then-recent amendments to the Administrative Procedure Act. E.g., U.S. Dep’t of Justice v. Julian, 486 U.S. 1, 17–19 (1988) (Scalia,
J., dissenting) (citing Memorandum from Ramsey Clark, Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep’t of
Justice, for the Exec. Dep’t and Agencies on the Pub. Info. Section of the Admin. Procedure
Act, at iv (June 1967)). Justice Scalia also joined Justice Kennedy’s unanimous opinion in
National Archives and Records Administration v. Favish, 541 U.S. 157, 169 (2003) (citing Memorandum from Ramsey Clark, Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, for the Exec. Dep’t &
Agencies on the Pub. Info. Section of the Admin. Procedure Act 36 (June 1967) and Memorandum from Edward H. Levi, Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, for the Exec. Dep’t &
Agencies on the 1974 Amendments to the Freedom of Info. Act 9–10 (Feb. 1975), reprinted
in H. Comm. on Gov’t Operations & S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong., Freedom of
Information Act and Amendments of 1974 (P.L. 93-502), Source Book: Legislative History,
Texts, and Other Documents 519-20 (Joint Comm. Print 1975)).
66.
See Brock v. Cathedral Bluffs Shale Oil Co., 796 F.2d 533, 537 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
67.
Eskridge, Federalist, supra note 16, at 1306 (citing, as examples, Bank One Chicago,
N.A. v. Midwest Bank & Trust Co., 516 U.S. 264, 283 (1996) (Scalia, J., concurring in part
and concurring in the judgment); Thunder Basin Coal Co. v. Reich, 510 U.S. 200, 219 (1994)
(Scalia, J., concurring); Conroy v. Aniskoff, 507 U.S. 511, 518 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring);
United States v. Thompson/Center Arms Co., 504 U.S. 505, 519 (1992) (Scalia, J., concurring); Begier v. IRS, 496 U.S. 53, 67 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring); Sullivan v. Finkelstein,
496 U.S. 617, 631 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring); Blanchard v. Bergeron, 489 U.S. 87, 97
(1989) (Scalia, J., concurring); Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 490 U.S. 504, 527 (1989)
(Scalia, J., concurring); United States v. Taylor, 487 U.S. 326, 344 (1988) (Scalia, J., concurring); INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 452 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring)); see, e.g.,
Carr v. United States, 130 S.Ct. 2229, 2241–42 (2010) (Sotomayor, J., writing the opinion of
the Court, which Justice Scalia joined except for Part III.C); Lamie v. U.S. Trustee, 540
U.S. 526, 528 (2005) (Kennedy, J., writing the Opinion for the Court, which Justice Scalia
joined except for Part III). Indeed, Justice Scalia has gone “so far as to refuse to join a
footnote of an opinion that he otherwise joined completely. This offending footnote merely
said ‘[w]e give no weight to the legislative history’ and briefly explained why.” Eskridge,
Federalist, supra note 16, at 1306 (citing Assocs. Commercial Corp. v. Rash, 117 S. Ct. 1879,
1882 (1997)).
68.
See Shinseki v. Sanders, 129 S.Ct. 1696, 1704 (2009) (Breyer, J.); Lincoln v. Vigil,
508 U.S. 182, 197 (1993) (Souter, J., writing for a unanimous court) (citing precedent quoting the Manual verbatim). Justice Thomas also joined both these opinions. 129 S.Ct. at 1699;
508 U.S. at 184.
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analysis of the legislative history of the APA, including the Manual.69
However, it is likely that their refusal to join this part of the opinion was
due to its mention of other forbidden sources, including a Senate Judiciary
Committee report, letters written by the Attorney General and his subordinates to various congressional committees, and the legislative history of
the 1976 amendments to the APA,70 rather than due to the Court’s reliance
on the Manual. Indeed, in Norton, Justice Scalia cited Darby for the proposition that the Manual is “a document whose reasoning we have often found
persuasive.”71 I have found no cases or scholarly articles in which Justice
Scalia chides judges for their reliance on the Manual or recants his prior use
of the Manual, as he did for the Advisory Committee Notes in Tome.
Justice Scalia’s use of the Manual is perhaps the most striking example
of this phenomenon, given his unflagging zealotry for textualism. He is
not, however, the only textualist judge to write or join opinions that utilize
the Manual. Judge James Buckley of the D.C. Circuit, another critic of
legislative history,72 has joined opinions that cite the Manual73 and has
consulted the Manual in his own opinions.74 Former D.C. Circuit judge,
Solicitor General, and Independent Counsel Kenneth Starr, who has authored impassioned critiques of judicial use of legislative history,75 has also

69.
509 U.S. 137, 138 (1993) (Blackmun, J., writing for a unanimous Court except for
Part III, which Justices Rehnquist, Scalia, and Thomas refused to join).
70.
See id. at 147-53.
71.
Norton v. S. Utah Wilderness Alliance, 542 U.S. 55, 63–64 (2004) (citing Darby
v. Cisneros, 509 U.S. 137, 148 n.10 (1993)).
72.
See Overseas Educ. Ass’n, Inc. v. Fed. Labor Relations Auth., 876 F.2d 960, 974–75
(D.C. Cir. 1989) (Buckley, J., concurring in part, joined by Starr, J.) (“We find [the majority’s] references to legislative history unnecessary, and we cannot accept the use of these
extra-statutory materials to place a restrictive gloss on the plain meaning of [the statutory
provision at issue].”); IBEW Local 474 v. NLRB, 814 F.2d 697, 715–20 (D.C. Cir. 1987)
(Buckley, J., concurring) (“When one undertakes to use legislative history as a tool of statutory construction, surely the first part of wisdom is to remember that Congress is a political
as well as a legislative body, and that its members will put the privileges and facilities of
their respective chambers to political as well as legislative uses. Thus not every utterance to
be found in committee reports or the Congressional Record may be assumed to represent
statutory gold.”); Eskridge, New Textualism, supra note 14, at 647.
73.
3M Co. v. Browner, 17 F.3d 1453, 1456 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (Randolph, J., writing the
opinion of the court).
74.
Indep. U.S. Tanker Owners Comm. v. Skinner, 884 F.2d 587, 591–92 (D.C. Cir.
1989) (consulting the Manual and finding that it “contradicts appellees’ position”).
75.
E.g., FEC v. Rose, 806 F.2d 1081, 1090 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (Starr, J.); see also Kenneth W. Starr, Observations About the Use of Legislative History, 1987 DUKE L.J. 371, 379
(“[T]he benefits accruing from the use of legislative history are marginal when weighed
against the potential for abuse and the enormous effort involved.”).
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joined judicial opinions that favorably cite the Manual76 and has described
the Manual in laudatory terms.77 Other notable examples abound.78

IV. CAN THIS ANOMALOUS PHENOMENON BE EXPLAINED?
Why, then, do textualists use the Manual when it shares so many of the
characteristics with legislative history that they find odious? In this section,
I canvass the five most promising explanations for textualist use of the
Manual. All ultimately fall short.

76.
Atlantic Richfield Co. v. United States, 774 F.2d 1193, 1200 n.33 (D.C. Cir. 1985)
(Edwards, J., writing the opinion of the court).
77.
Ass’n for Regulatory Reform v. Pierce, 849 F.2d 649, 652–53 (D.C. Cir. 1988)
(stating that the District Court Judge’s “opinion below aptly returned to” the Manual, which
he described as “one of the original guides to judicial understanding” (emphasis added)).
78.
Many judges who have expressed marked skepticism about the value of legislative
history have nonetheless cited the Manual in their opinions. Such judges include (1) Judge
Rogers of the Sixth Circuit, compare United States v. Cain, 583 F.3d 408, 418–19 (6th Cir.
2009) (Rogers, J.) (“Divining anything from unenacted legislation is always a risky business
. . . . ‘[T]he statements of individual legislators . . . during the course of the enactment
process’ may not ‘expand[] or contract[]’ legislation when ‘the statutory text adopted by both
Houses of Congress and submitted to the President’ is ‘unambiguous.’” (internal citations
omitted)) and City of Cookeville, Tenn. v. Upper Cumberland Elec. Membership Corp.,
484 F.3d 380, 390, n.6 (6th Cir. 2007) (Rogers, J.) (“We are mindful of the limited utility
and reliability of legislative history. In this regard, ‘the authoritative statement is the statutory text, not the legislative history or any other extrinsic material.’” (internal citations
omitted)) with Dismas Charities, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 401 F.3d 666, 679 (6th Cir.
2005) (Rogers, J.) (describing the Manual as “persuasive authority on the meaning of the
APA” and using the Manual to give content to the phrase “interpretative rules,” a term that
is undefined in the APA (discussed in Part IV.A and footnote 90, infra)); (2) Judge Becker of
the Third Circuit, compare United States v. Bowers, 432 F.3d 518, 522–24 (3d Cir. 2005)
(Becker, J.) (“[O]rdinarily even the contemporaneous remarks of a single legislator who
sponsors a bill are not controlling in analyzing legislative history.” (internal citations omitted)) with Dir., Office of Workers’ Comp. Programs v. Mangifest, 826 F.2d 1318, 1331–32
(3d Cir. 1987) (Becker, J.) (quoting the Manual for the proposition that “nothing in section
7(c) [556] is intended to preclude an agency from imposing reasonable requirements as to
how particular facts must be established”); and (3) Judge Silberman of the D.C. Circuit,
compare United States v. SCS Bus. & Technical Inst., Inc., 173 F.3d 870, 878–79 (D.C. Cir.
1999) (Silberman, J.) (“Courts sensibly accord such ‘postenactment legislative history,’
arguably an outright ‘contradiction in terms,’ only marginal, if any, value. Post-enactment
legislative history—perhaps better referred to as ‘legislative future’—becomes of absolutely
no significance when the subsequent Congress (or more precisely, a committee of one
House) takes on the role of a court and in its reports asserts the meaning of a prior statute.”
(internal citations omitted)) with Conn. Dep’t of Children & Youth Servs. v. Dep’t Health &
Human Servs., 9 F.3d 981, 984 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (Silberman, J.) (relying on the Manual to
define “policy statements”).
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A. Possible Analogies to The Federalist Papers
Perhaps the apparent inconsistency may be explained by analogizing
the Manual to The Federalist Papers. Ardent textualists frequently refer to
The Federalist when interpreting the U.S. Constitution,79 despite the fact
that the standard textualist “criticisms of legislative history apply, at least
superficially, to The Federalist,”80 just as they do to the Manual. Indeed,
textualist judges have, on occasion, invoked The Federalist “to create a constitutional limitation not apparent from the plain language of the
Constitution,”81 which appears analogous to the impermissible use of drafting history to render an otherwise clear provision ambiguous.82
The phenomenon of textualists using The Federalist may not be as
anomalous as it initially seems. Professor Eskridge has argued that a textualist judge who spurns legislative history may still be acting in a principled
79.
Eskridge, Federalist, supra note 16, at 1301–08 (noting that “the biggest consumers
of The Federalist and other pre-enactment constitutional history,” namely Justices Thomas
and Scalia, “will not even read pre-enactment legislative history of statutes,” and that “the
Supreme Court Justices most critical of considering pre-enactment legislative debates in
statutory cases are the most insistent that ratification debates be considered, and often be
decisive, in constitutional cases”); Scalia, supra note 1, at 38 (explaining that he consults The
Federalist because “their writings, like those of other intelligent and informed people of the
time, display how the text of the Constitution was originally understood”). For cases in
which textualist judges heavily rely upon The Federalist Papers, see, for example, Printz v.
United States, 521 U.S. 898, 910–15, 919–24 (1997) (Scalia, J., writing the opinion of the
Court); Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 221–23 (1995) (Scalia, J.); U.S. Term
Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 845–926 (1995) (Thomas, J., dissenting, joined by
Justice Scalia); and Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 697–99 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
80.
Eskridge, Federalist, supra note 16, at 1308–16. Some of the criticisms of The
Federalist Eskridge identifies are: “[i]f the collective ‘intent’ of the bicameral legislature is an
incoherent concept,” then “the collective ‘understanding’ of an entire nation during a constitutional moment must be even more so;” “The Federalist is not necessarily more reliable than
statutory legislative history in discerning usable collective understanding, [but rather] in
some respects, it may be less reliable;” The Federalist is, in some cases, every bit as ambiguous and indeterminate as statutory legislative history and therefore suffers equally from the
“look over the heads of the crowd and pick out your friends” problem. Id. But see John F.
Manning, Textualism and the Role of The Federalist in Constitutional Adjudication, 66 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 1337, 1348–50 (1998) [hereinafter Manning, Federalist] (distinguishing The
Federalist from legislative history).
81.
Eskridge, Federalist, supra note 16, at 1311 (referring to Printz, 521 U.S. at 909–24
(Scalia, J., writing the opinion of the Court)). “Printz is a high-water point for Scalia’s use of
The Federalist, because the specific constitutional texts of the Commerce Clause, the Necessary and Proper Clause, and the Supremacy Clause supported the dissenters and had to be
explained away.” Id. at 1307.
82.
See, e.g., Zedner v. United States, 547 U.S. 489 (2006) (Scalia, J., concurring)
(arguing that legislative history should not be used to render plain statutory language ambiguous); Overseas Educ. Ass’n, Inc. v. Fed. Labor Relations Auth., 876 F.2d 960, 974–76
(1989) (Buckley, J., concurring, joined by Starr, J.) (“As the Act speaks for itself, reference to
legislative history is unnecessary, and we cannot agree with our colleague’s use of legislative
materials to modify the plain meaning of the statute.”).
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manner if he or she consults The Federalist Papers because “the opentextured Constitution cries out for more context” than that needed to
interpret most statutes, and “[l]ong-departed constitutional debaters had
strong incentives to represent political consensus or equilibrium accurately.”83 In other words, constitutional interpretation is a qualitatively different
task than most statutory interpretation; it is a context where the originalist,
historicist strain of textualism triumphs over its trenchant semanticist
critique of drafting history.84
Obviously, the APA is a statute, not a constitution; thus, analogies to
The Federalist may initially seem inapposite. However, many commentators
have argued that “the APA is more like a constitution than a statute”
because
[i]t provides for flexibility in decision-making; it can be changed
through interpretation without the need for amendment; its
movements are more pendulum-like than linear. Its fundamental
role is to shape the relationship between the people and their government, giving the government considerable leeway in carrying
out the substantive laws that Congress has enacted, while at the
same time providing the governed with a considerable degree of
procedural protection.85
If this is correct, then textualists may have a principled reason to rely upon
both the Manual and The Federalist but not other forms of legislative history: the Manual, like The Federalist, provides crucial interpretive guidance
83.
Eskridge, Federalist, supra note 16, at 1323. It should be noted that while Professor
Eskridge believes the distinction between The Federalist and ordinary legislative history is at
least plausible, he does not appear convinced that the distinction completely resolves the
apparent inconsistency. Id. at 1316 (“I am not completely persuaded of the new textualist
position even under this better line of analysis, but neither am I persuaded that it is
wrong.”); id. at 1323 (“I am uncertain whether The Federalist, written long ago to a more
exclusive audience, is the most appropriate source of constraint . . . .”).
84.
See id. at 1301–07; see also Manning, Federalist, supra note 80, at 1355 (noting that
“the leading textualists typically subscribe to premises of originalism as well”) (citing Scalia,
supra note 1, at 35 and Frank H. Easterbrook, Alternatives to Originalism?, 19 HARV. J.L. &
PUB. POL’Y 479, 486 (1996)); Manning, Nondelegation, supra note 1, at 731–32 (“[T]extualists
readily acknowledge the importance of statutory context in determining meaning.”).
85.
Morrison, supra note 34, at 253; see, e.g., Sasha Samberg-Champion, How to Read
Gonzaga: The Seeds of a Coherent Section 1983 Jurisprudence, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1838, 1867
n.195 (2003); Shepherd, supra note 12, at 1558 (dubbing the APA “the bill of rights for the
new regulatory state”); Michal Tamir, Public Law as a Whole and Normative Duality: Reclaiming Administrative Insights in Enforcement Review, 12 TEX. J. C.L. & C.R. 43, 51 (2006)
(describing the APA as “a ‘quasi-constitutional statute’ whose foundations are in the Due
Process Clause of the Constitution”) (citing PETER H. SCHUCK, FOUNDATIONS OF
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 53 (1994); BERNARD SCHWARTZ & H.W.R. WADE, LEGAL CONTROL
OF GOVERNMENT: ADMINISTRATIVE LAW IN BRITAIN AND THE UNITED STATES 8 (1972)).
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and historical context regarding an extremely important, open-textured
document that balances the conflicting needs of flexibility and stasis.
At first blush, this comparison appears attractive. The Manual, like The
Federalist, provides interpretive guidance when the law to be interpreted
does not explicitly provide an answer to a legal question. For example, just
as The Federalist helps clarify whether it is constitutional to require state
officers to assist the execution of federal laws by conducting background
checks on potential handgun buyers,86 the Manual offers a helpful definition
of “interpretive rules,” a term defined in neither the text of the APA nor
the legislative history created by Congress.87 The Manual therefore appears
to provide much-needed “[o]riginal context” for this “open-textured, abstract, and process-oriented” term.88
However, this analogy is convincing only up to a point. Many of the
most persuasive arguments that purportedly absolve textualists of their
reliance on The Federalist in the constitutional context simply do not apply
in the context of the APA. “The best reason” to consult The Federalist but
not ordinary legislative history is “the different incentives of the speakers”:
whereas “[l]ong-departed constitutional debaters” arguably “had strong
incentives to represent political consensus or equilibrium accurately,” political actors who create statutory legislative history, such as the Department of
Justice during the APA’s drafting, have the “countervailing” incentive “to
bend future statutory construction toward their preferred, rather than the
actual, political equilibrium on some issues.”89 As detailed earlier in this
Note,90 there is strong evidence that the Department of Justice drafted the
Manual in the hopes that future courts would interpret the APA in a manner that favored the Executive Branch. Thus, it appears that even those
textualists who consult The Federalist should have second thoughts before
cracking open the Manual.
Professor Eskridge also argues that, because “the Constitution is more
open-textured” and “abstract . . . than statutes,” the “[o]riginal context” that
sources like The Federalist provide “is more useful, and even necessary, for
interpretation of such an ancient document” than it is for “more targeted”
and “concrete” statutes like the APA, “most of which have been enacted or
comprehensively revised in the last couple of generations.”91 Notwithstanding
86.
Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 909–24 (1997).
87.
Nagy, supra note 36, at 932 n.41. Since I have mentioned interpretive rules several
times throughout this Note, it is worth noting to avoid confusion that jurists use the phrases
“interpretive rules” and “interpretative rules” interchangeably. Id. at 930 n.32 (emphasis
added).
88.
Cf. Eskridge, Federalist, supra note 16, at 1302 (referring to the U.S. Constitution).
89.
Id. at 1323.
90.
See supra Part II.C.
91.
Id. at 1302.
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the APA’s “quasi-constitutional” status, even the APA’s most abstract provisions92 are arguably not as notoriously open-textured as constitutional
phrases like “necessary and proper,” “unreasonable searches and seizures,”
“due process of law,” “cruel and unusual punishments,” or “equal protection
of the laws.” Obviously, The Federalist does not address the meaning of all of
these constitutional provisions; that would be a chronological impossibility.
I mention them merely as a point of comparison to demonstrate that the
APA is not so abstract that textualists would be utterly lost were they not to
refer to contemporaneous historical materials like the Manual. The APA
was enacted only a few decades ago and is therefore not an ancient document that requires intense historical analysis to understand, at least
presently. Unlike the Founding Fathers, many persons born before the 1946
enactment are still alive; the political and linguistic culture of the time is
not wholly out of our grasp.93 Textualists do not need to rely on the Manual
to obtain an accurate historical picture of the APA in the same way that
they rely on The Federalist to interpret the Constitution.
Additionally, Professor Eskridge notes that “because statutes are easier
to change than the Constitution, a judicial interpretation that slights legislative expectations does potentially less harm than one that slights
constitutional expectations.”94 In other words, because the costs of neglecting to consult documents like The Federalist are so much greater than the
cost of failing to refer to statutory legislative history, even those who spurn
the latter are justified in using the former. Again, in this respect, the APA
is much more like a statute than a constitution. The process of amending the
APA is no more onerous than the process of amending any other statute.95 I
concede that amendments to the APA are rare and unlikely given “that the
APA is not a high visibility political issue,”96 but major amendments to the
APA are not unheard of.97 Thus, an argument based on the cost of errors of
failing to consult the Manual does not support the Manual’s use.
92.
Notoriously abstract provisions of the APA include section 706, which provides
that a “reviewing court shall . . . hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and
conclusions found to be . . . arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in
accordance with law” (emphasis added).
93.
Cf. Manning, Federalist, supra note 80, at 1357–58 (explaining that the Constitution was written so long ago that the context The Federalist supplies “transcends anything
that modern Americans could hope to replicate, even if they had the luxury and capacity to
immerse themselves in constitutional history in a way that no judge does”). But see In re
Sinclair, 870 F.2d 1340, 1342 (7th Cir. 1989) (Easterbrook, J.) (“Legislation speaks across the
decades, during which legal institutions and linguistic conventions change. To decode words one
must frequently reconstruct the legal and political culture of the drafters.” (emphasis added)).
94.
Eskridge, Federalist, supra note 16, at 1302.
95.
Morrison, supra note 34, at 268.
96.
Id. at 268–69.
97.
Id. at 269 (“There has been . . . one major set of changes to the APA. Beginning
in 1966 with the Freedom of Information Act, continuing in 1972 with the Federal Advisory
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Moreover, even assuming arguendo that The Federalist and the Manual
are perfectly analogous, it is not altogether certain that textualists are justified in using The Federalist Papers at all. The Federalist, like legislative
history, may be described as “a piece of political advocacy, whose contents
may at times reflect the exigencies of debate, rather than a dispassionate
account of constitutional meaning.”98 Indeed, “in the struggle over ratification, strategic considerations drove the contestants on both sides to minimize
and to exaggerate.”99 Likewise, as mentioned previously, The Federalist
shares many other characteristics with legislative history that cast doubt on
The Federalist’s reliability as an interpretive tool. If this is correct, then
analogizing The Federalist to the Manual would not fully resolve the textualists’ dilemma even if the analogy were persuasive.
For all of these reasons, a comparison to The Federalist Papers does not
provide a convincing explanation of the Manual’s use by textualists.

B. The Manual May Be Reliable When Its Interpretation Is Contrary to
Executive Branch Interests
According to Professor Beermann, although there are undoubtedly
concerns about the Manual’s neutrality, the fact that the Manual was drafted
with the Executive Branch’s interests in mind indicates that the Manual
may serve as an accurate interpretive guide “in those cases in which the
Manual’s interpretation is contrary to the Executive Branch’s interests.”100
Presumably the Attorney General would not have conceded to those interpretations if they were incorrect. This appears to offer textualists another
possible justification for their use of the Manual: insofar as the textualist
Committee Act and concluding in 1976 with the Government in the Sunshine Act and the
amendment to the APA adjudication provisions limiting ex parte contacts, Congress has
opened up the processes of administrative agencies to public scrutiny. In addition, these
sunshine statutes have altered the ground rules for resolving disputes between the people
and the agencies. Although courts still grant agencies a substantial degree of deference,
Congress has explicitly made agency decisions to withhold documents requested under the
FOIA subject to de novo review in the courts, with the government carrying the burden of
proof.” (internal citations omitted)).
98.
Manning, Federalist, supra note 80, at 1339. It should be noted, however, that
although Professor Manning believes that textualists should utilize caution when consulting
The Federalist, he does not believe that The Federalist is totally off limits: “A textualist judge
must never simply conclude that ‘the Constitution means X because this or that number of
The Federalist said that it means X’ . . . the principled textualist must also ask whether a
given essay, examined in light of all the surrounding contextual evidence, offers a persuasive
account of likely constitutional meaning.” Id.; see id. at 1359–60 (discussing how judges
should use The Federalist).
99.
Id. at 1358 (quoting Alpheus T. Mason, The Federalist—A Split Personality, in
ORIGINS OF AMERICAN POLITICAL THOUGHT 163, 168 (John P. Roche ed., 1967)).
100.
Beermann, supra note 12, at 790.
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critique of legislative history is based on a perceived lack of reliability,
reliance on sources that resemble legislative history, but demonstrate greater indicia of accuracy in specific contexts, may be defensible.
This argument also proves unavailing. Textualists regularly select
quotes from the Manual that advance, rather than stymie, executive interests. In other words, textualists are largely consulting the parts of the
Manual they should view most skeptically.
In Norton v. Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance, for example, Justice Scalia
cited the Manual for the proposition that the judiciary only has the power
“to compel an agency ‘to perform a ministerial or non-discretionary act,’ or
‘to take action upon a matter, without directing how it shall act’ ” under
section 706(1) of the APA.101 In other words, executive branch agencies
retain wide policy discretion which section 706(1) only curtails when the
agency has “failed to take a discrete agency action that it is required to
take.”102 This standard is clearly not contrary to the Executive Branch’s
interests.
Likewise, in his dissent in Bowen v. Massachusetts, Justice Scalia used
the Manual to support his contention that a state could not challenge a
particular federal executive agency’s decision in a federal district court, but
rather could only bring suit in a claims court.103 Had Justice Scalia’s opinion
carried the day, it would expand executive power by circumscribing the fora
in which some agency decisions can be challenged.
Justice Scalia also cited the Manual in a pro-executive manner in his
dissent in Webster v. Doe.104 He quoted the Manual’s assertion that the APA
intended “to restate the existing law as to the area of reviewable agency
action” to argue that the decision by the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency to terminate an employee was a discretionary act that could
not be reviewed for compliance with either the APA or the U.S. Constitution.105 This opinion also would have granted the Executive Branch great
101.
542 U.S. 55, 63–64 (2004) (emphasis in original) (quoting MANUAL, supra note 5,
at 108). Section 706(1) of the APA provides that a reviewing court shall “compel agency
action unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed.” 5 U.S.C. § 706(1) (2006).
102.
Norton, 542 U.S. at 64 (emphasis in original).
103.
487 U.S. 879, 922–25 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“I do not agree, however, that
respondent can pursue these suits in district court, as it has sought to, under the provisions
of the APA, since in my view they are barred by 5 U.S.C. § 704 . . . . The purpose and effect
of this provision is to establish that the APA ‘does not provide additional judicial remedies
in situations where the Congress has provided special and adequate review procedures.’
Attorney General’s Manual on the Administrative Procedure Act § 10(c), p. 101 (1947) . . . .
Respondent has an adequate remedy in a court and may not proceed under the APA in the
District Court because (1) an action for reimbursement may be brought in the Claims Court
pursuant to the Tucker Act, and (2) that action provides all the relief respondent seeks.”).
104.
486 U.S. 592, 609 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
105.
Id. at 606–11 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting MANUAL, supra note 5, at 94).
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discretion had it commanded a majority. Moreover, the fact that Justice
Scalia cited the Manual for its characterization of preexisting administrative
law is problematic; as mentioned previously, the existing law “was so unclear on many important issues, especially with regard to judicial review of
legal interpretations, that codification would have meant that the APA
provision had basically no discernible content.”106 This problem compounds
the criticism that textualists are citing unreliable portions of the Manual.
Brock v. Cathedral Bluffs Shale Oil Co.107 represents another example of
then-Judge Scalia using the Manual in ways that advance executive interests. He quoted the Manual’s definition of “general statements of policy” to
establish that the Secretary of Labor’s enforcement policy was not “a binding
regulation which the Secretary was required strictly to observe.”108 Again,
this decision preserved the flexibility of executive branch agencies to give
guidance to private actors without locking the agency’s policies into place.
Justice Scalia is not the only textualist to use portions of the Manual
that further executive interests. Judge Buckley quoted a provision of the
Manual that explains that “[t]he fact that an interested person may object to
such issuance, amendment, or repeal of a rule does not change the character
of the rule as being one” that exempts the agency from the requirement
that a rule be published no less than thirty days from the date it becomes
effective.109 A statement that a certain condition is insufficient to disqualify
an agency from an exemption from the APA’s procedural requirements
undoubtedly favors the Executive Branch.
Admittedly, there are counterexamples. For instance, in Bowen v.
Georgetown University Hospital, Justice Scalia’s concurrence used the Manual
to establish that executive agencies cannot make rules with retroactive
effect.110 This portion of the Manual provides an interpretation of the APA
that cabins executive power, and therefore may be reliable enough to survive textualist criticism.
That said, on the whole, textualists appear to use provisions of the Manual that benefit the executive. Professor Beermann’s observation regarding
the potential accuracy of provisions of the Manual that hinder executive
interests therefore fails to satisfactorily resolve the anomaly in most instances.
106.
Beermann, supra note 12, at 790.
107.
796 F.2d 533 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (Scalia, J., writing the Opinion for the Court).
108.
Id. at 536–39 (quoting MANUAL, supra note 5, at 30 n.3).
109.
Indep. U.S. Tanker Owners Comm. v. Skinner, 884 F.2d 587, 590–92 (D.C. Cir.
1989) (Buckley, J.) (quoting MANUAL, supra note 5, at 37, in turn interpreting section
553(d)(1) of the APA).
110.
488 U.S. 204, 218–19 (1988) (Scalia, J., concurring) (noting that the Manual states
that rules “must be of future effect, implementing or prescribing future law” (quoting
MANUAL, supra note 5, at 13–14)).
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C. Textualism as a Nondelegation Doctrine
Conceiving of textualism as a nondelegation doctrine may provide an
escape hatch for textualists who utilize the Manual. Professor Manning
argues that textualism does not derive its justification solely from invocations of the bicameralism and presentment provisions of Article I, Section 7
of the U.S. Constitution and the practical and theoretical critiques of
legislative history.111 Textualists regularly rely on case law, dictionaries, and
treatises (and, in the context of administrative law, agency interpretations
of ambiguous statutory provisions112) as guides to interpreting specialized
legal language, even though, like legislative history, these sources have not
passed through the bicameralism and presentment process.113 Rather, textualism’s ultimate justification may be the separation of powers established by
the U.S. Constitution. To Professor Manning, textualism is best understood
as a bar to legislative self-delegation.114 In other words, reliance on legislative history grants the legislative branch the power to both make and
interpret the laws, a combination that separation of powers jurisprudence
abhors.115 According to Professor Manning, “lawmaking and law-elaboration
must be distinct so that legislators will have a structural incentive not to
enact vague or ambiguous laws.”116 “[B]ecause all laws leave open spaces,
legislation necessarily entails an incidental” and permissible “delegation of
law elaboration authority to the agencies and courts that implement it.”
However, if Congress is permitted to “effectively delegate law elaboration
authority to its own committees or members,” then the “structural incentive” to “resolve important issues in the enacted text” is “substantially
undermined; issues left unresolved by a duly enacted statute will be clarified in accordance with the views of actors firmly under congressional
control, operating outside the constraints of bicameralism and presentment.”117

111.
Manning, Federalist, supra note 80, at 1338; Manning, Nondelegation, supra note 1,
at 675.
112.
See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844
(1984).
113.
Manning, Federalist, supra note 80, at 1338; Manning, Nondelegation, supra note 1,
at 695–707. Additionally, textualists may also “embrace such sources” because “a reasonable
legislator would have consulted them to determine the meaning of the law for which he or
she was voting.” Manning, Federalist, supra note 80, at 1342.
114.
Manning, Nondelegation, supra note 1, at 706–07.
115.
Id.; see also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1 (“All legislative Powers . . . shall be vested in . . .
Congress . . . . “ (emphasis added)); Manning, Nondelegation, supra note 1, at 711 (“[T]he
federal Constitution includes measures expressly designed to give Congress imperfect
control over those who implement, and thus interpret, its laws.”).
116.
Manning, Federalist, supra note 80, at 1338.
117.
Manning, Nondelegation, supra note 1, at 706–07.
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This observation initially affords textualists some justification for their
apparent contradiction. The Manual may be best analogized to a common
law treatise,118 which Professor Manning deems an acceptable tool for
textualists in certain circumstances.119 Unlike legislative history, the Manual
was written by the Executive Branch. Even though the Department of
Justice played an important role in the APA’s drafting, it did not adopt the
role of a legislator per se, and it does not remain under direct congressional
control. Thus, a textualist might argue, judicial use of the Manual does not
amount to legislative self-delegation, because it does not afford the legislature
the power to both make and interpret the laws.
While judicial use of the Manual does not amount to legislative selfdelegation, it still appears to offend separation of powers principles as an
example of excessive executive aggrandizement or encroachment. Some
degree of delegation to the Executive Branch to interpret the laws is
expected, necessary, and desirable.120 However, if the Department of Justice
is allowed to affect judicial interpretation of duly-enacted statutory provisions merely by issuing an official manual, without express congressional
authorization to do so, then the Executive Branch has enormous power to
unilaterally change the meaning of statutes in ways that benefit the executive. To be sure, executive agencies, as a result of their policy-making
expertise, often receive judicial deference to reasonable interpretations of
ambiguous provisions in the statutes they administer.121 That said, agencies
like the Department of Justice have no interpretive authority over statutes
they are not authorized to administer, like the APA.122 Additionally, the
118.
See Beermann, supra note 12, at 790 (“The Attorney General’s Manual on the Administrative Procedure Act stated simply that the judicial review provisions of the APA were
meant to codify existing law.” (emphasis added)). But see the difficulties with characterizing
the APA as codifying existing law discussed supra Part II.C.
119.
Manning, Federalist, supra note 80, at 1352–54.
120.
See Manning, Nondelegation, supra note 1, at 710–11, 725–26 (“In contrast with
legislative self-delegation, the transfer of some policymaking discretion to agencies and
courts is more readily understood as a matter of constitutional necessity, and as less amenable to control through judicially administrable standards. To that extent, textualists tolerate
executory delegation because it is preferable to the alternative—unchanneled judicial application of an assertive nondelegation doctrine.”).
121.
E.g., Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837
(1984); see also Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 726 (1986); Manning, Nondelegation, supra
note 1, at 715 (citing Metro. Wash. Airports Auth. v. Citizens for the Abatement of Aircraft
Noise, Inc., 501 U.S. 252, 275 (1991)) (“The [Supreme] Court has sustained sharp distinctions between conventional delegations of lawmaking power to administrative agencies and
attempts by Congress to delegate power to its own components or agents.”).
122.
E.g., William S. Jordan, III, Chevron and Hearing Rights: An Unintended Combination, 61 ADMIN. L. REV. 249, 254 (2009) (“[I]t is well established that interpretations of the
APA are not subject to Chevron deference.”) (citing Thomas W. Merrill & Kristin E. Hickman, Chevron’s Domain, 89 GEO. L.J. 833, 896–97 (2001)).
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informality with which the Manual was drafted and released strongly implies that the Attorney General’s interpretation should not be treated
authoritatively.123 Consequently, under Professor Manning’s analytical
framework, in which judicial reference to extra-textual sources implicates
the separation of powers, judicial use of the Manual appears to grant the
Executive Branch the mutant cousin of the unconstitutional line item
veto:124 the ability to effectively alter the content of a law outside the confines of the bicameralism and presentment process. Thus, conceiving of
textualism as a nondelegation doctrine fails to excuse textualist use of the
Manual.

D. Some Textualist Use of Legislative History May Be Acceptable
Some, including Professor Manning, have argued that one can still be a
principled, orthodox textualist without adopting an exclusionary rule completely barring all reference to legislative history. Although one should not
consult legislative history to divine an unexpressed legislative intent, it may
be permissible to use legislative history to “suppl[y] an objective, unmanufactured history of a statute’s context,”125 as long as the judge first performs
“a full and independent verification of the accuracy and persuasiveness of
[the legislative history’s] contents.”126 Doing so would arguably not implicate the same constitutional concerns that animate textualism. This
argument is somewhat comparable to the analogy to The Federalist, but has
some key differences. It is therefore worth quoting Professor Manning at
length on this subject:
If, for example, a statute codifies an established term of art, and the
committee creates a historical document (the committee report)
that recites evidence (perhaps the leading cases) establishing the
settled meaning of that term, judicial examination of that evidence
does not assign the committee the power to determine the meaning
of the law enacted by Congress as a whole. Rather, such a committee report may simply offer the Court insight into the way in
which any reasonable person, skilled in the legal arts, would have
understood the relevant phrase, independent of the committee’s
subjective understanding of statutory meaning. In those circumstances, the committee serves as a persuasive relator of statutory
context, rather than the actual creator of that context through its
own idiosyncratic expression of intent. And the resulting legislative
123.
124.
125.
126.

E.g., United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218 (2001).
See Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417 (1998).
Manning, Nondelegation, supra note 1, at 731.
Id. at 733.
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history may add substantial value to the interpretive process by
supplying a well-informed, contemporaneous account of the relevant background to the enactment. Because textualists readily
acknowledge the importance of statutory context in determining
meaning, such uses of legislative history should present little theoretical difficulty for textualist judges.127
If the Manual had the same characteristics as these permissible, contextual
forms of legislative history, then perhaps textualist use of the Manual would
not pose theoretical difficulties.
At first the analogy seems attractive. The Manual was written against
a background of administrative common law that, to some extent, was
purportedly imported into the APA. The Department of Justice sought to
catalog, for the benefit of executive branch agencies, which administrative
law practices survived the APA and which Congress found problematic and
sought to excise. Thus, the Manual may merely be affording helpful historical context.
However, forcing the Manual into this category appears akin to shoving
a square peg into a round hole. The Manual does far more than merely
capture the objective, shared understanding of terms of art or discuss the
developments that led to the APA’s adoption for historical context. The
Manual provides definitions of statutory terms of art, but often does so
with such specificity that it would be absurd to say that “any reasonable
person, skilled in the legal arts, would have understood the relevant phrase”
in that manner.128 For instance, it is unlikely that “any reasonable person” in
the 1940s would inevitably conclude that “[t]he phrase ‘foreign affairs functions,’ used” in section 553(a)(1) “is not to be loosely interpreted to mean
any function extending beyond the borders of the United States but only
those ‘affairs’ which so affect relations with other governments that, for
example, public rule making provisions would clearly provoke definitely
undesirable international consequences,”129 and that “the exemption is not
limited to strictly diplomatic functions.”130 This ultra-specific statement is
an expression of legislative and executive intent, not an objective definition
that would have been shared by all participants in the heated legislative
battle. Indeed, the Department of Justice extracted this insight from the
127.
Id. at 731–32.
128.
See id.
129.
MANUAL, supra note 5, at 26 (quoting S. REP. NO. 752, at 13 (1945) and H.R. REP.
NO. 1980, at 23 (1945)) (citing Representative Walter’s statement in ADMINISTRATIVE
PROCEDURE ACT: LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, S. DOC. NO. 248, at 358 (2d Sess. 1946)).
130.
MANUAL, supra note 5, at 27 (citing Representative Walter’s statement in
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT: LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, S. DOC. NO. 248, at 157 (2d
Sess. 1946)).
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legislative history of the APA, thereby doubly compounding the theoretical
difficulty of textualist use of the Manual.131 A similar argument can be
made about the Manual’s definition of “interpretative rules” in section
553(b)(A).132
Thus, the Manual goes far beyond “recit[ing] evidence (perhaps the
leading cases) establishing the settled meaning of” statutory terms and
“identify[ing] the events that precipitated the enactment of” the APA.133 To
the contrary, the Manual fulfills the same functions of legislative history
that textualists deem impermissible, namely the creation of context by
interested participants in the legislative process.
Moreover, the concerns raised previously about the Manual’s accuracy
and reliability imply that the Manual would fail the “full and independent
verification of the [document’s] accuracy and persuasiveness” that Professor
Manning prescribes.134 Again, there is doubt that the Manual codified
existing administrative law practice because there likely was no uniform
practice to codify, and the Department of Justice had great incentives to
manipulate the Manual’s contents.135 The Attorney General has performed
the impermissible task of creating, rather than restating, context, and thus the
Manual may not be conceived as an acceptable form of legislative history.

E. The Manual as a Mere Corroborating Authority
The final possibility is that textualists do not use the Manual as a controlling authority; rather, they merely use the Manual to confirm that their
understanding of the APA is correct. Admittedly, I have not come across
any cases in which a textualist judge uses the Manual to override the interpretation he or she would otherwise ascribe to the APA or joins an opinion
that does so.136 Similarly, I have not found any textualist opinions in which
the Manual is the sole authority cited for a proposition; use of the Manual
is always accompanied by citation to precedent, learned treatises, and other
statutes and is supported by some degree of independent analysis of the
131.
Id.
132.
See supra Part IV.A.
133.
Cf. Manning, Nondelegation, supra note 1, at 731–33.
134.
Id. at 732–33.
135.
See supra Part III.
136.
See, e.g., Shinseki v. Sanders, 129 S. Ct. 1696, 1700–08 (2009) (Breyer, J., joined by
Justices Scalia and Thomas); Norton v. S. Utah Wilderness Alliance, 542 U.S. 55 (2004)
(Scalia, J.); Dir., Office of Workers’ Comp. Programs, Dep’t of Labor v. Newport News
Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co., 514 U.S. 122, 123–36 (1995) (Scalia, J.); Brock v. Cathedral
Bluffs Shale Oil Co., 796 F.2d 533 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (Scalia, J.); Lincoln v. Vigil, 508 U.S.
182 (1993) (Souter, J., writing for a unanimous court, including Justices Scalia and Thomas);
Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 216–25 (1988) (Scalia, J., concurring);
Bowen v. Massachusetts, 487 U.S. 879, 913–30 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting); Webster v.
Doe, 486 U.S. 592, 606–21 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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statutory text and historical context.137 Textualists are far from using the
Manual to effect “the triumph of supposed ‘legislative intent’ . . . over the
text of the law.”138 Thus, one might reply that this is all much ado about
nothing.
Such a conclusion would be incorrect. In close cases, arguably any
amount of corroboration can tip the balance.139 Judges rarely, if ever,
explicitly rest their holdings on a single dispositive source. Each citation,
be it the Manual, The Federalist Papers, a case, statutory text, or the Advisory
Committee Notes to the Federal Rules of Evidence, buttresses the overall
architecture of a judicial opinion.140 As Justice Scalia himself has stated in
another context, “ ‘[a]cknowledgment’ of [a particular source cited in a
judicial opinion] has no place in the legal opinion of this Court unless it is
part of the basis for the Court’s judgment.”141 In other words, every citation
counts. Removing any single source will probably not cause the structure to
collapse like a house of cards, but it will at least make the opinion more
precarious. Moreover, the probative value of any individual cited authority
is affected by every other corroborative or contradictory source before the
Court; the landscape of sources must be viewed holistically. Judges therefore ultimately make an all-things-considered judgment, based on the
totality of legal authority before the Court, where every citation in the
opinion works in concert to affect the end result.142 Put differently, quotations from the Manual arguably color the entire analysis and therefore drive
end results more than the text of judicial opinions initially suggest. Relatedly,
137.
See supra note 136.
138.
Scalia, supra note 1, at 18–23 (discussing Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States,
143 U.S. 457 (1892), a case loathed by textualists for allowing legislative history to trump
statutory text).
139.
A substantial number of cases in which textualists cite the Manual were arguably
close cases about which reasonable jurists could disagree. The Court splintered and/or
reached a different result than the court below in: Norton v. Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance, 542 U.S. 55 (2004) (reversing the Court of Appeals); Bowen v. Massachusetts, 487 U.S.
879, 913–30 (1988) (splitting 5-1-3 and reversing the court of appeals in part); Webster v. Doe,
486 U.S. 592, 606–21 (1988) (reversing the court of appeals in part); and Brock v. Cathedral
Bluffs Shale Oil Co., 796 F.2d 533 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (reversing the district court).
140.
Moreover, the judicial decision-making process is not a quantitative task; there is
no objective scale on which a judge may place each source she cites and divine whether or
not her opinion would be rendered legally correct by the addition or subtraction of any
single authority. See Frank B. Cross, Decisionmaking in the U.S. Circuit Courts of Appeals, 91
CALIF. L. REV. 1457, 1462 (2003) (“Though the classical legal theory of decisionmaking
assumes a formal process, this process cannot be reduced to an algorithm.”). A judge will
necessarily approach all available sources in a holistic manner.
141.
Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 628 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (emphasis in
original) (attacking the majority’s argument that “[t]he opinion of the world community [on
the death penalty], while not controlling our outcome, does provide respected and significant confirmation for our own conclusions.” Id. at 578 (Kennedy, J.)).
142.
See supra note 140.
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although it is impossible to divine from the text of the opinions, citations of
the Manual may have helped textualists attract nontextualist votes for their
opinions. Thus, there is arguably no such thing as a merely confirmatory
citation.
Alternatively, even if one assumes it is possible for a source to be merely confirmatory, theoretical difficulties still arise. If it is acceptable to use
the Manual as a merely confirmatory authority, then there appears to be no
reason for textualists to break from opinions that use ordinary legislative
history in a manner that purports to simply corroborate the analysis in the
remainder of the opinion, as Justice Scalia did in Tome and countless other
opinions.143 It seems that one should either use both legislative history and
the Manual, or neither.
A textualist might retort that, while his or her nontextualist counterparts use other forms of legislative history as controlling authorities even
when they simply corroborate the accompanying analysis, a textualist uses
the Manual because it merely “displays how the text of the [APA] was originally understood.”144 In other words, perhaps textualists use documents like
the Manual in a qualitatively different fashion than the way nontextualists
use legislative history. However, as Professor Eskridge argues, this distinction “amounts to little more than a language game.”145 Whereas users of
legislative history are portrayed as “looking for a ‘legislative intent,’ which
is labeled subjective and unknowable,” textualists using documents like the
Manual claim they “are looking for an ‘original understanding,’ which is
labeled objective and knowable.”146 “In practice,” says Professor Eskridge,
“legislative history and [documents like the Manual] are deployed in similar
ways: as persuasive evidence of original understanding.”147
In short, none of these avenues offer salvation to the textualist who
uses the Manual.

V. WHY?
Why, then, have textualists come to rely so heavily on the Manual
while they spurn more traditional forms of legislative history? I offer several possible explanations below, but concede that they are understandably
speculative.

143.
See supra Parts III–IV.
144.
Eskridge, Federalist, supra note 16, at 1312–14 (quoting Scalia, supra note 1, at 38)
(describing a distinction attempted by some textualists to justify their use of The Federalist in
constitutional interpretation).
145.
Id. at 1313.
146.
Id. at 1314.
147.
Id. at 1313.
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One possibility is that courts have been citing the Manual for so long148
that the practice has become ingrained in the judiciary’s collective unconscious. Perhaps quoting the Manual has evolved into an unthinking habit.
This explanation is not entirely satisfactory, however, for use of traditional
legislative history was also a deeply-ingrained habit for practitioners and
judges that was nonetheless broken by the textualist revolt of the 1980s.149
It is therefore improbable, although certainly not impossible, that mere
inertia continues to drive textualist use of the Manual.
A more convincing possibility is as follows: because many (although
not all) contemporary textualists are political conservatives,150 and because
many (although not all) political conservatives favor strong executive power,151 perhaps textualists have not fully appreciated the ramifications of their
use of the Manual because the pro-executive slant of the Manual152 confirms
their instincts as to what the correct legal result should be in any particular
case. This explanation would not necessarily entail that textualists are adjudicating in bad faith. Rather, it suggests that textualists view the Manual as
merely corroborative.153 If the Manual suggested results contrary to textualists’ perceptions of what the correct outcome of a case should be as a legal
matter, they would arguably subject the Manual to greater scrutiny.
A related but more controversial argument is that textualists are indeed
acting in bad faith by capriciously abandoning their jurisprudential methodology whenever doing so would produce ideologically preferable results.
This theory suggests that textualists intentionally or recklessly ignore the
Manual’s analogousness to legislative history, and therefore create an
148.
The Supreme Court, for example, has been regularly citing the Manual since at
least the 1960s. See Shinseki v. Sanders, 129 S. Ct. 1696, 1704 (2009); Norton v. S. Utah
Wilderness Alliance, 542 U.S. 55, 63–64 (2004); Darby v. Cisneros, 509 U.S. 137, 148 n.10
(1993); Bowen v. Massachusetts, 487 U.S. 879, 903, 903 n.36 (1988); Chrysler Corp. v.
Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 302 n.31 (1979); Int’l Tel. & Tel. Corp. v. Local 134, Int’l Bhd. of Elec.
Workers, 419 U.S. 428, 442–43 (1975); FCC v. Schreiber, 381 U.S. 279, 293 n.20 (1965).
149.
See Eskridge, New Textualism, supra note 14, at 621, 623–24.
150.
See, e.g., Francisco J. Benzoni & Christopher S. Dodrill, Does Judicial Philosophy
Matter?: A Case Study, 113 W. VA. L. REV. 287, 295 (2011). But see id. at 295 n.26 (noting the
counterexample of Justice Hugo Black, arguably both a liberal and a textualist); Paul Killebrew, Where Are All The Left-Wing Textualists?, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1895, 1898–1900 (2007)
(arguing that there is no necessary connection between textualism and conservative ideology).
151.
E.g., Christopher H. Schroeder, Causes of the Recent Turn in Constitutional Interpretation, 51 DUKE L.J. 307, 310 n.12 (citing Christopher H. Schroeder, A Conservative Court?
Yes, 1993 PUB. INT. L. REV. 127, 130–46). But see Molly McDonough, Pitching to a New
Lineup, A.B.A. J. EREPORT, Feb. 3, 2006 (“[B]eing conservative . . . doesn’t necessarily mean
that a justice will be ‘a handmaiden of a strong executive . . . .’ ” (quoting Bruce Fein)).
152.
See supra Part II.C.
153.
But see the difficulties with dubbing sources “merely corroborative” discussed
supra Part IV.E.
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arbitrary and indefensible distinction in order to produce results that favor
the Executive Branch. Scholars of many ideological stripes have argued that
textualists often abandon textualism when convenient in other contexts.154
However, sophisticated theoretical and empirical accounts of judicial behavior suggest that, while judges are undoubtedly influenced, be it consciously
or unconsciously, by their political ideologies, they are ultimately constrained to some extent by traditional modes of legal reasoning.155
Textualism, and the desire to remain consistent with it, provides such a
constraint.
Therefore, while it is possible textualists are simply acting in bad faith,
the most convincing explanation is that textualists truly believe they are
being consistent with textualism as they cite the Manual. It is likely that
textualists erroneously believe that the Manual is qualitatively different
from, and more akin to The Federalist or a learned treatise than, the forbidden fruit of legislative history. They are probably unfamiliar with the
aforementioned articles that cast doubt on the Manual’s reliability. Thus, it
is likely that the originalist strain of textualism leads them to view the
Manual as a helpful guide to the APA’s original meaning.

154.
See, e.g., Daniel J. Bussel, Textualism’s Failures: A Study of Overruled Bankruptcy
Decisions, 53 VAND. L. REV. 887, 893 (2000) (“[T]extualism (at least in the bankruptcy
caselaw) appears to be a method only of convenience for the Court majority and abandoned
at will.”); Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., Expropriatory Intent: Defining the Proper Boundaries of
Substantive Due Process and the Takings Clause, 80 N.C. L. REV. 713, 736 n.105 (2002) (“Justice
Scalia and Justice Thomas, among the Supreme Court’s most ardent supporters of textualism
and originalism in interpreting the Constitution, abandon their loyalty to these interpretive
schools when Takings Clause questions appear at bar . . . . [O]ne would be hard pressed to
refute an inference that these Justices simply refuse to follow their ostensibly preferred
interpretive rules in this context because, in Takings Clause cases, such an approach simply
will not support the substantive outcomes that they prefer.”); Miranda McGowan, Do As I
Do, Not As I Say: An Empirical Investigation of Justice Scalia’s Ordinary Meaning Method of
Statutory Interpretation, 78 MISS. L.J. 129 (2008); The Roberts Court and Federalism: Minutes
from a Convention of The Federalist Society, 4 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 330, 346 (2009)
(statement of Professor Jeffrey Rosen) (suggesting that Justice Scalia “will relax or abandon”
textualism “in cases like the sovereign immunity and Eleventh Amendment cases, when he’s
more interested in limiting access to the courts,” but stopping short of suggesting “that
Justice Scalia is nakedly unprincipled in any way”).
155.
See, e.g., Cross, supra note 140, at 1460-61 (explaining that empirical analysis
reveals that judicial decision making is best explained and predicted by a combination of
traditional “legal and ideological variables,” rather than either law or ideology alone); Matthew C. Stephenson, Legal Realism for Economists, 23 J. ECON. PERSP. 191, 208 (2009)
(characterizing the “Formalism vs. Skepticism dichotomy” as “stale” and suggesting a more
“nuanced” Realist “account of judicial decision making . . . based on a belief that judges care
about outcomes, but that legal doctrine also exerts an influence on legal decisions because
judges feel the need to justify their conclusions in acceptable legal terms. Judges must
therefore consider the relative costs and benefits of investing effort in following something
other than the path of least (legal) resistance”).
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CONCLUSION
A. Why Does All This Matter?
This phenomenon is more than a curiosity of theoretical interest. As
discussed previously, the Manual presents a pro-executive slant that may
not accurately represent the legislative compromise reached by Congress
when enacting the APA.156 Textualism is derived from a model of the judiciary as a “faithful agent[] of Congress” that “must ascertain and enforce
Congress’s commands as accurately as possible.”157 Thus, when textualists
utilize the Manual, they may be aggrandizing the Executive Branch while
simultaneously failing to act as faithful agents to the Congress. This shifts
the balance struck by the constitutionally-mandated separation of powers,
and thereby may lead to different results in administrative law and policy
than would otherwise obtain.

B. Epilogue
Thus, if a judge claims she is a textualist, she should be a textualist all
the way down. She should eschew all references to legislative history and its
analogues, including the Manual, which presents textualists with all the
same theoretical and practical objections as more common forms of legislative history. Otherwise, she should confess her heresy and convert. This
would not mean she would have to utilize legislative history blindly and
unthinkingly. Textualists make excellent points about the reasons to be
skeptical of legislative history as a guide to congressional intent, and even
nontextualists have come to acknowledge these criticisms. Rather, our
hypothetical judge would afford legislative history weight commensurate
with its persuasiveness. Again, I take no position in this Note about which
side she should choose as a normative, theoretical, or practical matter. Both
sides of the debate make compelling points, which explains why the debate
over statutory interpretation has raged on for decades. However, a textualist judge cannot have her proverbial cake and eat it too; she must choose
one or the other.

156.
See supra Part II.C.
157.
John F. Manning, What Divides Textualists from Purposivists?, 106 COLUM. L. REV.
70, 71 (2006).

